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“Philosophy is everywhere, even in the ‘facts,’ 
and it nowhere has a private realm 
which shelters it from life’s contagion.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs 
“The problem that I study in Visible and Invisible 
is the same as that of  dialectics and Marxism. 
It is the problem of  openness.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Unpublished Note* 
Several decades ago, Donn Welton and Hugh Silverman published Critical and Dialec-
tical Phenomenology (1987), a volume of  collected papers from the annual meetings of  
the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in 1984 and 1985. The 
term “critical phenomenology” appears once in the book, and does not serve as the 
name of  an altogether new kind of  phenomenology so much as it offers adjectival 
modification of  the old kind; Welton distinguishes between “classical” phenomenology, 
and phenomenology that is “more dialectical and critical” (xv).1 Critical phenomenol-
ogy, then, or at least “a more dialectical and critical phenomenology,” names some-
thing that was being practiced at SPEP in the 1980s: a philosophy that understood 
itself  to be rooted in the classical phenomenological tradition at the same time as it 
somehow moved beyond those boundaries in terms of  content, method, or discipline. 
 
     * I am grateful to David Morris for sharing this quotation and relating some of its attributional 
history. Morris cited it in his paper “Merleau-Ponty and Mexica Ontology: Time as Templace-
ment,” which he delivered at the 2017 Merleau-Ponty Circle in Albuquerque, NM. Renaud Barbaras 
transcribed many of Merleau-Ponty’s notes from the period of time Merleau-Ponty was working 
on The Visible and the Invisible. Barbaras’s student Franck Robert filled in and revised the transcrip-
tion, which was an appendix to Barbaras’s thesis. That thesis emerged as a book, Phénoménologie et 
Ontologie, but without the transcribed appendix. The version quoted here is based on a review and 
corrections of a selection of these notes by David Morris with the assistance of Juliette Corsy. The 
note is on p. 226 of Bibliothèque Nationale de France VIII.2 of Merleau-Ponty’s notes located be-
tween two other unpublished notes dated 1959. It is also discussed by Mariana Larison in L’Être en 
forme: Dialectique et phénoménologie dans la dernière philosophie de Merleau-Ponty (2016, 50).   
     1 Welton characterizes Thomas Busch’s contribution to the volume as “dialectical and critical phe-
nomenology,” in which Busch describes Sartre’s move away from the emphasis on “unfettered freedom” 
in Being and Nothingness toward an interest in “the problem of ambiguity and conditioned existence” 
(1987, xv) in The Critique of Dialectical Reason. However, he also uses the term to name the collective work 
of the volume itself. The full sentence reads: “In many respects Thomas Busch finds in Sartre that same 
turn from a classical to a more dialectical and critical phenomenology that is at least adumbrated by all 
the authors in this volume” (xv).
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     Other than that volume, there had been little that travels under the name of  “critical 
phenomenology” within Continental philosophy until recently, with Lisa Guenther’s 
Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives in 2013 and Michael Marder’s Phenom-
ena-Critique-Logos: the Project of  Critical Phenomenology in 2014.2 In framing the project of  
critical phenomenology, Guenther defines it thusly:
By critical phenomenology I mean a method that is rooted in 
first-person accounts of experience but also critical of classical phe-
nomenology’s claim that the first-person singular is absolutely pri-
or to intersubjectivity and to the complex textures of social life. The 
critical edge of this approach emerges through an engagement with 
the work of Frantz Fanon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emman-
uel Levinas [. . .] I have sought to develop a method of critical phe-
nomenology that both continues the phenomenological tradition of 
taking first-person experience as the starting point for philosophical 
reflection and also resists the tendency of phenomenologists to privi-
lege transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity.  
(2013, xiii, xv) 
 
For Guenther, an emphasis on intersubjectivity is what makes phenomenology critical. 
She utilizes classical phenomenology’s advocacy of  a first-person perspective at the 
same time as she resists the kind of  transcendental idealism that would fix subjectivity 
into an individual and atomized subject, a singular subject surrounded by a world that 
it has constituted. This is a common critique of  phenomenology: that its methods are 
insufficient for describing the relation of  self  to world, despite having this as its explicit 
goal. Phenomenology risks becoming a method whereby the world is collapsed back 
into consciousness (the charge of  solipsism frequently leveled against Husserl) or of  
articulating a relation between self  and world in which the two are indistinguishable, 
with the effect that the world turns out also to be self  (a frequent critique of  Mer-
leau-Ponty’s work).3 Some of  Merleau-Ponty’s own formulations can easily confirm 
such readings, such as his pronouncement in Phenomenology of  Perception (2012) that “I 
am the absolute source” [je suis la source absolue] (xxii). He attempts there to describe a 
realignment of  knowledge that might unseat the dominion of  science and objective 
     2 The sole exception that I can find is Max Velmans’s “Heterophenomenology versus Critical Phe-
nomenology.” Velmans is a psychologist who advances critical phenomenology as a philosophy of mind, 
contra Daniel Dennett, “in which first- and third-person accounts of the mind are treated as being com-
plementary and mutually irreducible” (2007, 227). Guenther’s project is more concerned with offering a 
critical phenomenology of the effects of solitary confinement, while Marder is reflecting on the category 
of phenomenology itself, which he understands to be necessarily critical in that it reflexively raises the 
question of its own meaning. Marder suggests that “critique is the name for the relation between phe-
nomena and logos” (2014, 2) which is “not superadded to but rather is endemic to phenomenology” (10).
     3 See Merleau-Ponty’s “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” and the short, final chapter of The Visible 
and the Invisible, “Preobjective Being, The Solipsist World.” Husserl’s own references to solipsism and 
the “solipsistic reduction,” particularly in the fifth Cartesian meditation, would seem to confirm such 
worries. David Carr, however, suggests that Husserl uses solipsism in an experimental way in order to 
acknowledge the other even though I have no access to his or her experience. See: Carr, “The ‘Fifth 
Meditation’ and Husserl’s Cartesianism”; Irigaray’s discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s “labyrinthine solip-
sism” in “The Invisible of the Flesh” (1993, 157);  Merleau-Ponty’s own comments on the untenability 
of the phenomenology of the subject in The Visible and the Invisible, in which he moves away from the 
philosophy of consciousness that characterized Phenomenology of Perception toward a philosophy of Being.
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perspective, but appears to replace it with a transcendental subject from whom ev-
erything emerges, inviting the charge, advanced by Levinas among others, of  a sub-
jectivism that cannot see otherness. Moving as it does between idealism and realism, 
Merleau-Ponty’s work in the Phenomenology sought to find a way out of  the snare of  
dualistic thinking in which so much of  Western philosophy has found itself  tangled. In 
his own assessment, he was not quite able to free himself  from the dualism of  subject/
object relations in Phenomenology of  Perception, and his late work tried to radically recon-
figure that attempt.           
     Levinas was foremost among those who challenged Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy on 
the grounds that it fails to engage alterity, that it is not responsive to the otherness of  the 
other, that it advances a perceiving subject who in looking toward the world finds only 
reflections of  itself. Scott Marratto has recently argued, contra Levinas’s critique that 
otherness is subsumed into sameness within Merleau-Ponty’s theorizations of  vision, 
that Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of  expression and vision “establish, on the one hand, 
the possibility of  encountering otherness, and on the other hand, the possibility of  
recognizing the genuine alterity of  the other” (2017, 243; italics in original). There is an 
openness at the heart of  being, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, and that openness rests on 
a prior relation to alterity. In the preface to Phenomenology of  Perception, Merleau-Ponty’s 
characterizations of  method are a call for philosophy to turn back on itself: a turning 
back in which it interrogates itself. Yet this turning is somehow not the same as reflec-
tive analysis. This turning back allows us to see the ways in which human beings are 
subjects “destined to the world,” in Merleau-Ponty’s words (2012, xxiv); the world and 
those who inhabit it are opaque to reflective analysis, transformed into a “problem” by 
the cogito, but are precisely that which is disclosed by the phenomenological method, 
which he describes as the means by which we can arrive to, rather than shut out, the 
world:
Because we are through and through related to the world, the only way 
for us to catch sight of  ourselves is by suspending this movement, by 
refusing to be complicit with it (or as Husserl often says, to see it ohne 
mitzumachen [without taking part]), or again, to put it out of  play. This 
is not because we renounce the certainties of  common sense and of  
the natural attitude—on the contrary, these are the constant theme of  
philosophy—but rather because, precisely as the presuppositions of  
every thought, they are “taken for granted” and they pass by unno-
ticed, and because we must abstain from them for a moment in order 
to awaken them and to make them appear. Perhaps the best formu-
lation of  the reduction is the one offered by Husserl’s assistant Eugen 
Fink when he spoke of  a “wonder” before the world. Reflection does 
not withdraw from the world toward the unity of  consciousness as the 
foundation of  the world; rather, it steps back in order to see transcen-
dences spring forth and it loosens the intentional threads that connect 
us to the world in order to make them appear; it alone is conscious 
of  the world because it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical.  
(xxvii) 
 
Here, “reflection” is what lets us feel the grip our certainties and presuppositions have on 
our perception of  the world, and when we notice but do not engage with those certain-
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ties, the world itself  is allowed to emerge around us. What is revealed by the reduction 
as Merleau-Ponty conceives it is not a knowledge of  essences, not the revelation of  tran-
scendental structure. While phenomenology is concerned with both essences and tran-
scendental structures, the true purpose of  our engagement with them for Merleau-Pon-
ty is not system-building but an instrumental way into the world in which we are already 
dissolved. What results is not a certainty, but a rupture, a making-strange of  the world, 
one which “can teach us nothing except the unmotivated springing forth of  the world” 
(xxvii). The world does not dissipate or disappear as the intentional threads that bind 
us to it slacken, rather, we feel it newly “springing forth” as our constituting conscious-
ness is replaced with receptive being. Our stance of  certainty is transformed into one 
of  wonder, and our relation to the world is one of  felt openness.4 Rupture describes our 
relation to the world once our structures of  knowing are held in abeyance, and also our 
relation to our habits of  perception which are similarly dis-oriented once we step back 
from the natural attitude.          
     Very soon after warning us about the dangers of  reflective analysis and his vow to es-
chew explanation, Merleau-Ponty makes this move at the end of  the preface, fundamen-
tally recasting philosophy as reflective and reflexive: “It will be necessary that philosophy 
direct toward itself  the very same interrogation that it directs toward all forms of  knowl-
edge. It will thus be indefinitely doubled; it will be, as Husserl says, an infinite dialogue 
or meditation” (2012, xxxv). Thus the project of  phenomenology is an open and unfin-
ished one, whose goal is also an opening. “Man” is not at the center of  the world like the 
spadix in the lily. He is instead inevitably open to it because he is of  a piece with it, com-
prised of  it, and the value of  the reduction is that it might allow him to see the world in 
its springing forth, not merely in its conformation with his knowledge of  it. This turn-
ing-back is the opposite of  mastery, and it brings not verification but strangeness. The 
phenomenologist does not find what she was already seeking. She feels herself  folded into 
the undifferentiated presence of  the world once she suddenly cannot recognize it.   
     In “The Masked Philosopher,” Foucault speaks of  curiosity as a modality of  critical 
thought, a modality that in its operation bears a startling resemblance to the phenom-
enological reduction. Through curiosity, critical thought “evokes the care one takes for 
what exists and what might exist” (Foucault, quoted in Rabinow 1997, xxi). With this 
invocation of  care, Foucault reminds us of  the stakes of  critique, and that power is nev-
er reducible nor intimately proximate to the individual. He continues in his description 
of  all that is called up by curiosity: “a sharpened sense of  reality, but one that is never 
immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain 
determination to throw off our familiar ways of  thought and to look at the same things 
in a different way” (xxi). Foucault’s curiosity is here twin to Eugen Fink’s “wonder” 
before the world, a faculty that when we are able to exercise it, when we engage our 
“determination” to see the world anew, renders that which surrounds us as suddenly 
strange and odd.                   
     The caricature of  phenomenology as a philosophy that is too subjective and too 
trapped inside first-person perspective to be able to offer any purchase on ethical or 
political struggles sees its mirror opposite in the caricature of  critical theory as too struc-
turally focused, too “high-altitude,” to borrow from Merleau-Ponty, to be able to offer 
any insight into the intimate textures of  lived experience. But as I hope to at least gesture 
     4 See also Eugen Fink’s comments on wonder in “The Problem of Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology.” 
See Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink (2004, 348).
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toward here, neither of  these formulations is sufficiently attentive to either methodolo-
gy. The world is always at stake in my phenomenological perceptions. When I reach, it 
is into the world and toward alterity that I am reaching. And critical theory’s anchor in 
structural considerations can be motivated by the most urgently personal of  concerns. 
     “Untimeliness and Punctuality” (2005) is an essay by Wendy Brown in which she 
considers critical theory as “a hope rather than a luxury in dark times” (5). She reminds 
us that the first gesture of  critique is not dismissal or a turning away but a moving closer 
with attention, care, curiosity. It can also have the effect of  disorienting us, if  exactly by 
showing us how much is at stake in our considerations, including ourselves. But disori-
entation is not its primary result. Critical theory, Brown says, is necessarily attuned to its 
times and engaged with politics, but it cannot be merely negation. It is “bound not only 
to speak to the times but also to affirm them…critical theory focused on political life is 
not negation, destruction, or nihilism; rather, critical theory aims to render crisis into 
knowledge, and to orient us in the darkness. Critique that does not affirm life, affirm value, 
and above all affirm possibilities in the present and the future, while certainly possible, is 
not making a bid for political power and hence cannot be understood as political” (15).5 
Thus, even in its most political moments, critique is necessarily a project of  affirmation 
and even of  “reclamation,” in Brown’s words. It is a setting-right of  the wrongs perpe-
trated by failures of  justice, but a setting-right that may proceed in ways that are untime-
ly, a cycle of  rupture and repair whose temporality is unsettled by the force of  critique. 
     Returning to the question that centrally concerns this paper: when asking what a 
critical phenomenology is, we might maintain that it reflects on the structural condi-
tions of  its own emergence, and in this it is following an imperative that is both critical 
in its reflexivity and phenomenological in its taking-up of  the imperative to describe 
what it sees in order to see it anew. In this, what is critical about critical phenomenology 
turns out to have been there all along.       
  
A familiar trope in literary studies today is the characterization of  critique as a way of  
thinking whose time has passed, and critical theory as a paranoid style of  reading that has 
exhausted itself. In The Limits of  Critique (2005), Rita Felski, for instance, understands cri-
tique as synonymous with suspicion, paranoia, and negation, and has asserted that after 
decades of  critique, we are living in a postcritical age, one in which criticism has spent 
itself, and new modes of  reading must be found. The most paradoxical thing about this 
way of  describing critique—and Felski’s book here joins Eve Sedgwick’s writing in Touch-
ing Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (2003) on paranoid and reparative reading—is that 
even as it makes a strident and even moral call for a different kind of  reading practice, 
it itself  proceeds by assessing its object and finding it suspicious, bankrupt, duplicitous. 
That is: when it grounds its demand for the abandonment of  critique in a diagnosis of  
critique as suspicious, paranoid, skeptical, and asymmetrical, such a work shows itself  
to be more “critical” than the critical theory it lampoons. What seems to elude the prac-
titioners of  these attacks on critique is that these attacks are comprised of  nothing other 
than criticism, and criticism of  a very particular kind, one well-captured by Penelope 
Deutscher’s observation of  “that interesting gesture of  wanting what can’t be supplied 
     5 I thank A.B. Huber for reminding me of this passage.
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from a theory understood as having failed to provide it” (2017, 6). But not all critiques 
of  critique are quite so cartoonish. Indeed, not all calls for new reading practices within 
literary studies understand these practices to be opposed to critique; some proponents 
of  “surface reading,” for instance, understand such modes of  reading to themselves be 
forms of  critical practice, ones that proceed by way of description.6    
     Moving to dismiss critique on the grounds that it has outlived its usefulness requires 
one to overlook a vast swath of  current work in critical theory engaged with questions 
of  violence, racial injustice, gender inequality, and a host of  other urgent political is-
sues.7 Critical theory, in the broadest sense, offers a supplement to phenomenology in 
particular and to philosophy in general through its engagement with matters such as 
these, which philosophy has too often dismissed as to the side of  “real” philosophical 
concerns. What future promise might be offered by the intertwining of  these two ap-
parently “outmoded” styles of  thought, phenomenology and critique? We can have 
a better sense of  an answer if  we return to the question of  what critique can do, a 
question that Judith Butler has repeatedly taken up.       
     Butler asks “whether a passage through a transcendental form of  argumentation can 
lead to political and social consequence” when thinking about critique, noting its origin 
in Kant and the transformations it undergoes when taken up by Foucault to think about 
power, knowledge, and the subject (2009, 776). Butler reminds us that for Kant, critique 
is a way of  calling into question the self-legitimation of  philosophy, and that critique 
operates with two questions that light the way toward inquiry: in what way and by what 
right? Through Kant and Foucault, she defines critique as “the operation that seeks to 
understand how delimited conditions form the basis for the legitimate use of  reason in 
order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped—
the three aims of  critique as Kant formulated them” (787). Critique, for Foucault, is 
ultimately indistinguishable from the production of  the self. Here we would seem to 
be at a far distance indeed from the comparatively more pedestrian aims of  phenom-
enological description. And yet, beneath the determination of  delimited conditions, 
beyond the epistemological limit-seeking often understood to comprise critique, Butler 
finds at its heart an openness: “The notion of  critique is bound up with what we still 
call open inquiry, even though we understand that what makes an inquiry open is some-
thing that circumscribes and binds the inquiry and so determines a limit to its opera-
tion” (776).            
     Utilizing Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and critique together is not without its 
dangers. There are plenty of  points at which the two methods appear as divergent, if  
not incompossible, and there may be some perversity on insisting on the possibility of  
their pairing. When, in the preface of  the Phenomenology of  Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of  truth and error, he does so with the cheerful confidence that in our experience 
of  the world, we are already apprehending truth. “We are in the truth,” he writes, “and 
evidentness is ‘the experience of  truth’” (2012, xxx). When we are asking after the na-
ture of  our perceptions, or the essence of  perception itself, we are not contending that 
this or that perception is true, “but rather that perception is defined as our access to the 
     6 See Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, “Surface Reading” (2009); Love, “Close but not Deep: De-
scriptive Ethics and the Literary Turn” (2010) and “Close Reading and Thin Description” (2013); and 
Best, Marcus, and Love, “Building a Better Description” (2016).
     7 Exemplary of the abundance of such work within contemporary critical theory is Amy Allen’s series 
“New Directions in Critical Theory” with Columbia University Press and the series “Reinventing Crit-
ical Theory,” edited by Gabriel Rockhill and Yannik Thiem with Rowman and Littlefield.
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truth” (xxx). This smacks of  the presentism of  which phenomenology is often accused, 
and would seem to orient phenomenology in opposition to critique, which might ask 
how that truth came to be true in the first place, what structures of  power undergird 
and what forms of  knowledge secure its legitimation. Is Merleau-Ponty advocating a 
form of  naiveté in which anything I perceive must be true? Does not this kind of  epis-
temological privilege assume a subject that is not being imperiled or crushed by the 
“truth” that he or she stands before? These are fair questions, and ones that may not be 
fully satisfied with the resources that classical phenomenology has to offer.    
     Looking at critique with careful eyes, however, leads us to three fundamentally signif-
icant resonances with the critical and phenomenological enterprises. First is the sugges-
tion that critique, like phenomenology, is an attempt to move beyond a kind of  dualism, 
a “move beyond the outside-inside alternative” (Foucault 1997, 315) in order to push 
into “the frontiers” of  what is known. Second is the insistence that what at first appears 
to be a purely negative endeavor, a finding of  limit, is incomplete if, upon finding that 
limit, it comes to a stop. Just as the reduction is not a means to banish or negate the 
world, but rather the condition through which it can more fully emerge, critique is not 
a cataloguing of  the limitations of  the present situation, as Wendy Brown reminds us. 
“We are not talking about a gesture of  rejection,” Foucault states firmly, in a refutation 
of  those characterizations of  critique that view it as merely negation, unproductive, 
sterile (315). The critique that Foucault calls for transforms its questions into a positive 
mode. As he describes it:
[I]f  the Kantian question was that of  knowing [savoir] what limits 
knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that 
the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: 
In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is 
occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of  ar-
bitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of  necessary limitation into a practical critique 
that takes the form of  a possible crossing-over [franchissement]. (315) 
     And it is in that crossing-over, that gesture of  opening, where the phenomenolog-
ical and critical projects find what is arguably their strongest resonance. Surprisingly 
enough, for critique—just as for phenomenology—that opening is revealed through the 
work of  description. To read critique as an unmasking, or the paranoid excavation of  
what is “really” going on behind superficial appearances, is to altogether mistake the 
relation between the apparent and the real.  As Foucault puts it: “the role of  philoso-
phy is not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that 
is to say, to make evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that 
because of  that we do not perceive it. Whereas the role of  science is to reveal what we 
do not see, the role of  philosophy is to let us see what we see” (Foucault, quoted in Da-
vidson 1997, 2).8 For all Foucault’s resistance to phenomenology, the centrality of  this 
fundamental phenomenological insight to his own method is manifest and significant. 
     8 Davidson cites Foucault’s “La Philosophie analytique de la politique,” part of his untranslated Dits et 
écrits (1978). Davidson hears in this passage a “tone reminiscent of Wittgenstein, but without mentioning 
his name” (1997, 2); I myself, perhaps not unsurprisingly, hear an echo of Merleau-Ponty’s language in 
this passage.
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Foucault’s view of  truth, like Merleau-Ponty’s, is resolutely non-idealist. When he states 
that “[truth is a thing of  this world,” he is, like Merleau-Ponty, insisting that truth is not 
hidden (Foucault 1980, 131). But truth for Foucault cannot be thought without attend-
ing to the constraints that produce it. That truth is of  this world means that it is not ide-
al or transcendental, but also, crucially, that it is always saturated with power relations: 
“Truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power” (131). It is here that the joining of  the 
critical and the phenomenological might be most urgent: if  phenomenology offers us 
unparalleled means to describe what we see with utmost precision, to illuminate what 
is true, critique insists that we also attend to the power that is always conditioning that 
truth.            
     Notwithstanding the parsing of  these categories, what can we say about works that 
might be counted as critical phenomenology, or that name themselves thusly? How 
might a newly enlivened kind of  scholarship emerge from these two forms of  think-
ing, both of  which have been dismissed as outmoded or irrelevant? Guenther, you will 
recall, names Fanon, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas as her primary interlocutors. She 
even dubs them as “postphenomenologists,” as a way of  naming their critical poten-
tial, despite the fact that they all reside uncontroversially within the phenomenologi-
cal tradition, thus ensuring that the relationship between phenomenology and critical 
phenomenology is not one of  inside and outside, but perhaps of  crossing over, where 
each lends its insights to the other. Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, 
Others (2006) uses the spatial orientations of  phenomenology to think about queerness, 
and also uses queer reading practices to reexamine phenomenology’s own presuppo-
sitions. Or we might think of  Johanna Oksala’s (2016) recent work, in which she com-
bines phenomenology and Foucauldian critical theory to rethink the relations among 
feminism, ontology, and relations of  power. Or, still more expansively, the phenome-
nology of  listening offered by Jill Stauffer’s Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of  Not Being 
Heard (2015), in which she uses Levinas to teach us to re-hear the testimony of  survivors 
of  violence and traumatic injustice. How can we use phenomenology to think about 
the urgent dilemmas of  our present moment, including those subjects that phenome-
nology itself  failed to adequately address? To my mind, Amy Allen’s book The End of  
Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of  Critical Theory (2016) is a model of  the-
oretical work that uses the conceptual tools and frameworks within critical theory to 
challenge its own complicity in perpetuating unjust structures of  power and inequality.9 
And Allen, too, invokes the power of  openness, using it to name a kind of  epistem-
ic humility that is required for the decolonization of  critical theory. She calls for an 
open-ended dialogue with alterity within critical theory and proposes that “such an 
openness and open-endedness require what Chakrabarty characterizes as an openness 
‘to the possibility of  our thought systems … being rendered finite by the presence of  
the other’” (210). The new work currently emerging in phenomenology offers every 
reason to hope that it, too, might be on the cusp of  its own decolonization and re-
flexive self-consideration, and that it might yet be capacious enough to simultaneous-
ly encompass the revelation of  its limitations as well as the expansion of  its reach. 
     Describing the reaction of  readers encountering phenomenology for the first time, 
Merleau-Ponty says that many philosophers upon encountering it did not exactly have 
the experience of  coming up on a new philosophy, but rather of  finding a thing for 
     9 See in particular Amy Allen’s discussion of Adorno, Foucault, and the postcolonial in The End of 
Progress (2016, 198-203).
                                                         What’s Critical About Critical Phenomenology?  • 16Gayle Salamon
Puncta   Vol.1    2018 
which they had long been waiting (2012, xxi). It is an essential rather than an accidental 
feature of  phenomenology that it constantly renews itself  in a deliberately suspended 
state between a present, intimate expression and the open field in which all of  its not-
yet-arrived and unpredictable iterations will emerge, inexhaustibly. If  it is true that, as 
Merleau-Ponty said, “phenomenology has remained for so long in a nascent state, as 
a problem and as a promise,” then surely this is no less true presently for critical phe-
nomenology (xxi). If  phenomenology is still a problem and a promise, this sets before 
the budding critical phenomenologist a task less taxonomical than speculative, that in 
viewing the world and describing it with all possible precision, we might see the world 
and all the objects and others within it open, and reveal themselves to be more varied 
and more mysterious than our imaginations could have conjured, or our schemas of  
knowledge contain. And we can reflexively consider our own philosophical legacies, in-
cluding their omissions and their missteps, not to dismiss those older forms of  thinking 
and ways of  understanding but to constantly renew them and expand their capacities. 
     Openness, Merleau-Ponty says, is the problem he was immersed in when working 
on The Visible and the Invisible (1968). It is the problem that would occupy him through 
the writing of  that unfinished work, the problem that was shared with dialectics and 
Marxism. The problem and the promise of  openness may still be the source from which 
phenomenology’s richest possibilities spring forth, even in these dark times.
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